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The John Marshall Journal
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THE APPLICATION OF THE CITATION
PROCEDURE FOR THE DISCOVERY AND
RECOVERY OF ASSETS IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES
By RICHARD D. GUMBEL, JR.*
INTRODUCTION

Within recent years the use of the citation procedure for the
discovery and recovery of assets in the administration of estates
has increased. Petitions therefore have become so numerous
that four judges presently assigned to the Probate Division of
the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, now hear such matters in addition to the assignments of other aspects of the administration of estates.
Limitations of time and space do not permit a comprehensive analysis of all the cases dealing with the citation proceeding,
however, this article is intended as a practical guide to the attorney representing a personal representative or other person
involved in or interested in the discovery or recovery of assets
during the administration of an estate.
Essential to an understanding of what follows is a familiarity with what the term "citation" means as used in connection
with the administration of an estate for the disclosure and recovery of assets and the statutory article entitled "Citation to
Recover Property and Discover Information."' The title of the
article is an over-simplification of the entire procedure. No
small confusion has resulted from the many judicial holdings applicable to the several provisions of the article, and the principles
relating to the law of gifts, trusts, joint tenancies and contracts
as they are relevant to citation proceedings.
* Richard D. Gumbel, Jr., Associate Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois; B.S. in B.A., Xavier University, 1951; J.D., Georgetown
University Law Center, 1954; admitted to the Bar of Washington, D.C.
in 1954 and to the Illinois Bar in 1955; formerly an Assistant to the Probate
Judge, Probate Court of Cook County, Illinois and a Magistrate in the same

court.
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance given him by Merrilie
W. Johnson, James R. Schirott and Steven I. Winer of the Journal staff.
The author is also indebted to Mrs. Francine Pones and Mrs. Carol Dunford
for their help in preparation of the manuscript.
1ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §§183-87a (1969).
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A citation is a process adopted in civil proceedings from the
canon and the civil law,2 and has in some respects greater force
than a summons, since the only penalty for failure to respond to
a summons in a purely civil proceeding is that the respondent or
defendant therein will be defaulted and have judgment entered
against him; the failure to respond to a citation properly issued
and served upon a respondent may lead to his incarceration. So
a citation is both a summons and a subpoena. The citation is issued pursuant to an order of court and it commands the appearance of the respondent on a day certain, at a time and place set
forth therein. It certainly is not a notice; notice and citation
are not synonymous. A notice is sufficient in probate when the
action of the court is on a thing - in rem -3 but it is insufficient
when the anticipated order is to be enforceable upon a respondent
to compel the delivery of property and property rights. The effective issuance of a citation can emanate only from the office
of the clerk of court and thereby becomes enforceable upon the
respondent when served. Without the clerk's signature and seal
the document is nothing more than mere writing or print.
The earliest statute enacted in the State of Illinois on the
subject of citation in probate proceedings was for the purpose of
having a person, or persons, appear and be examined on oath
touching upon the possession, concealment or embezzlement of
any property or evidence of property belonging to a deceased
person. 4 That statute, enacted in 1829, provided for the enforcement of the court's orders and the means for compelling a reluctant respondent to testify or produce required documents.
The citation could issue even if the named respondent was in another county. 5 While the primary section of the earlier statute
was silent as to the recovery of property, another section implied the power of the court to order the recovery of property
upon proper showing and proof that an executor or administrator
"... was chargeable with so much of the estate.., as they...
shall recover and receive." 6 Strictly construed, the respondent
in such proceedings was the person from whom the property had
to be recovered because the proceeding was instituted against
the person who had in his possession the property or pertinent
documents, although the actual action for recovery was not maintainable in a probate court.
2

State v. McCann, 67 Me. 372 (1877).
STAT. ch. 3, §§64, 99 (1969).

3 ILL. REv.

The court in In re Estate
Rackliffe, 366 Ill. 22, 7 N.E.2d 754 (1937) noted: "Short-cut court proceed-

ings cannot be substituted for the provisions of a special statute where the

rights and liberty of a citizen are involved." Id. at 28, 7 N.E.2d at 757.
4 WILLS AND TESTAMENTS, §86 (1829) ILL. REv. LAWS 191.
5 People ex 'el. McKee v. Abbott, 105 Ill. 588 (1833).
6 WILLS AND TESTAMENTS, §88 (1829) ILL. REv. LAWS 191.
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Subsequently, in 1871, a law entitled "Collection and Disposition of Assets"7 was enacted and made substantial changes
in the citation procedure. Three important differences existed
between the 1829 statute, as amended in 1845, and the 1871 statute. First, the earlier statute, as amended, did not extend to a
petitioner obtaining information from persons who did not possess the property sought to be recovered, or from the custodian
of documents necessary for the recovery of other property from
other persons. Secondly, while the earlier statute, as amended,
provided for procedural enforcement orders and recovery only
by implication, the 1871 statute expressly provided that the
courts were empowered to "make such order in the premises as
the case may require." The Supreme Court of Illinois held that
by implication of the statute, the court had the power to examine
witnesses other than the parties to the proceedings." The court
pointed out the glaring defect in the prior statute by stating that
it could "not suppose that the legislature intended in all cases to
have the party examined, much less to let the rights of the estate
turn, alone, on the evidence of the party charged with having the
property."
Thirdly, the 1871 statute corrected an injustice
created by a supreme court holding that:
[u]nless the respondent had the identical money in his possession
which had been received by his wife, the court could not properly
order him to pay it over to the administrator, nor would it be possible for him to comply with such order. The payment of other
money to an equal amount would not be a compliance with the
statute .... 9
In 1874 the citation remedy was extended to estates of incompetents,"° and in 1919 it was provided by statute that the
citation remedy was available for utilization in the estates of
minors." Thus, the statute now in force and effect, enacted in
1939,12 and subsequently amended, is a combination of several
sections of former statutes. 13
THE PRESENT STATUTE

The initial section of the statute begins by providing in pertinent part that:
§81 (1871-72) ILL. LAWS 77.
8Wade v. Pritchard, 69 I1. 279, 282 (1873).
9 Williams v. Conley, 20 Ill. 643 (1858). The court did not consider
7 ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES,

$1.00, the equal of another $1.00, -but rather it had to be the same bill Mrs.
Williams had obtained from her father, the decedent. The court said that

the statute was designed to obtain possession of property "which remained
in specie". The court reasoned that a payment other than in specie was the
payment of a debt. Id. at 644. See alo Densmoor v. Bressler, 164 Ill. 211,
45 N.E. 1086 (1896).
10 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 86, §53 (1874).

11 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 64, §50b (1919).

§82 (1939).
REv. STAT. ch. 3, §82 (1939) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 64, §52 (1939);

12ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3,
's ILL.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 86, §54 (1939).
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Upon the filing of a verified petition therefor, the court shall order
a citation to issue for the appearance before it of any person whom
the petitioner believes (1) to have concealed, converted, or embezzled or to have in his possession or control any personal property ... which belonged to a person whose estate is being administered in that court or which belongs to his estate or to his executor, administrator, guardian, or conservator or (2) to have information or knowledge withheld by the respondent from the executor,
administrator, guardian or conservator and needed ..
for the recovery of any property ...

14

Section 183 provides further that "(t) he citation shall be
served not less than 10 days before the return day designated
therein and shall be served and returned in the manner provided
for summons in civil cases." The minimum time before return
day and the method of service of the citation were not provided
for in the earlier statutes. Obviously the stated time limitation
is in fairness to the respondent so as to allow him to marshal
the facts and information demanded of him and to allow time for
an adequate presentation of his position on conflicting claims and
issues. 15
Finally, in 1965, the act was amended to delete the word
"probate" from the citation statute. This was made necessary
by the enactment of a new judicial article which provided for a
single Circuit Court for each judicial circuit' 6 thereby abolishing
the several "Probate Courts" throughout the state. With the

abolition of the "Probate Courts" and the adoption of the new
judicial article went the many instances of limited jurisdiction
which delayed and obstructed a final resolution of many of the
7
problems in the administration of an estate'
THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A CITATION

Historically, these citations were first used chiefly for dis14 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §183 (1969).
15

16

4 W. JAMES, ILLINOIS PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE 318 (1st ed. 1951).
ILL. CONST. art. VI, §8 (1870).

17 In 'e Estate of Peters, 34 11.
2d 536, 217 N.E.2d 3 (1966). Sims v.
Powell, 390 Ill. 610, 62 N.E.2d 456 (1945), involved a citation proceeding
with five respondents. The appellant contended that the probate court was
without jurisdiction to enter an order affecting a trust for the lack of general
chancery jurisdiction. The court rejected the contention because the appellant had been a party to a consent decree, but it pointed out that the
probate court had no power to determine titles to real estate in citation
proceedings. In Moser v. Feciura, 324 Ill. App. 552, 58 N.E.2d 920 (1945),
the creditors of the decedent sought to set aside a conveyance of property
from the decedent to his daughters. On hearing in the probate court there
was a finding for the daughters. The creditors appealed from an adverse
ruling rendered in the Superior Court of Cook County where they contended
that the probate court order was a nullity. The appellate court agreed and
held that such an order could be attacked collaterally and the creditors were
not obliged to take an appeal from that order. The appellate court indicated
that the probate court lacked jurisdiction where the question of real estate
ownership was involved.
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covery purposes."8 With that limited purpose, the petitioner was
not faced with the problem of drafting an exacting pleading. In
fact, earlier statutes required that the petitioner allege that he
was "ignorant of the information" he sought in the proceedings. 19
It is without question that the provision of the statute as regards
discovery is used often as a "fishing expedition." While the citation remedy is not an exclusive one for the petitioner, it was enacted for the purpose of giving a personal representative in an
estate a speedier and less expensive way of discovering and recovering assets belonging to the estate which he represents,2 0 ob-1
taining information of which he has no independent knowledge2
and promoting an honest, complete and prompt administration of
the estate. 22 Some have characterized a citation proceeding for
discovery as a "glorified deposition;" it has also been characterized as the equivalent of a deposition with greater satisfaction. 23 The proceedings are often instituted and maintained even
though the petitioner is fully cognizant of the facts because he is
desirious of having the respondent admit to the pertinent facts
while under oath and before a judicial officer.
The citation procedure is purely statutory 24 and does not fall
within either of the time honored distinctions of a matter being
either at law or in equity. It was held to bear the equitable aspects of a bill for discovery. 25 This is of little importance when
drafting the petition because the distinctions have been abolished
by statute. 26 A clear majority of petitions presented pursuant
to Section 183 pray for the issuance of a citation for discovery
of assets and the production of various books and records. Petitioners usually allege that they believe the named respondents
to have information or documents which will lead to the recovery
of assets. Such petitioners pray for any and all relief to which
18 Kahn, Discovery and Recovery Citations in the Probate Court, 44 ILL.
B.J. 202 (1955).
19 Simms v. Guess, 52 Ill. App. 543 (1893).
20Wilson v. Prochnow, 359 Ill. 148, 194 N.E. 246 (1934); Martin v.
Martin, 170 Ill. 18, 48 N.E. 694 (1897).
21 Simms v. Guess, 52 Ill. App. 543 (1893).

22 People ex rel. McKee v. Abbott, 105 Ill. 588 (1882).
23 Kahn, Discovery and Recovery Citations in the Probate Court, 44 I1.
B.J. 202 (1955).

24In re Estate of Hill, 30 Ill. App. 2d 243, 174 N.E.2d 233 (1961);
Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Egan, 143 Ill. App. 572 (1905).
25 Skidmore v. Johnson, 334 Ill. App. 347, 79 N.E.2d 762 (1948); Wood
v. Tyler, 256 Ill. App. 401 (1930) ; In re Estate of Bennett, 248 Ill. App. 174
(1928); 4 W. JAMES, ILLINOIS PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE 319 (1st ed.
1951).
26ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §31 (1969); see Leighton, Elements of
Equitable Relief 2 JoHN MAR. J. PRAc. & PRoc. 230 (1969). In Ellman

v. DeRuiter, 412 11. 285, 106 N.E.2d 350 (1952), the Illinois Supreme Court

said: "There has been a fusion (of law and equity) sufficient to enable a
court of law, when the occasion demands it, to apply equitable principles...

Id. at 292, 106 N.E.2d at 353,
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the court deems petitioner entitled. The petition for issuance
of a citation to discover is not subjected to the scrutiny which is
given to a petition for recovery. As will be enlarged upon hereinafter, a petition for the issuance of a citation for recovery must
allege with extreme specificity and particularity the property
sought to be recovered and the petitioner's right to such property.
The draftsman of the petition for the issuance of a citation
must decide whether he is going to seek information or recovery.
As stated above, if he does not have sufficient information to allege a basis for recovery, he should seek recovery. When the
petitioner alleges that he is unable to discover the exact nature of the property or how the property, the decedent and
the respondent were, or, are inter-related, and prays that "such
order or orders may be entered by the court, and such action
taken by the court, pursuant to Chapter 3, Article 183 (sic)
and following . . . as may be in the best interest of the estate . . . " the court is unable to adjudicate title or claim
to property because there are no issues on which to enter judgment. 27 If the petitioner seeks an accounting of property from
the respondent, all allegations to support such relief must be as28
serted in the petition.
WHO MAY BE A PARTY TO A CITATION PROCEEDING?

Under the provisions of the statute, the petition may be
brought by the possessor and holder of letters as a personal representative in an estate "or by any other person interested in the
estate or, in the case of an estate of a minor or incompetent, by
any other person. '29 Infrequently, the petitioner falls into the
category of "any other person." It is usually the personal representative who initiates the proceedings. The "any other person interested in the estate" may be an heir, 0 legatee,' 1 a devisee,2 a personal representative against his predecessor 2 or a
27

(1967).

In

re Conservatorship of Baker, 79 Ill. App. 2d 234, 223 N.E.2d 744

28 In In re Estate of Garrett, 81 Ill. App. 2d 141, 224 N.E.2d 654 (1967),
it was held that the court's order must be based upon an issue established
by the pleadings.
29 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §184 (1969).
30Johnson v. Nelson, 341 Ill. 119, 173 N.E. 77 (1930); Kahn, Joint
Tenancies and Citations, 20 DECALOGUE J. 12 (1969), where the author notes:
In testate estates a disinherited heir is probably not an interested person
until such time as the will which disinherited him has been set aside.
There is no decision construing the citation statute, but Schroeder v.
Gerlack, 366 Ill. 596, 10 N.E.2d 332 (1937) is authority for this proposition by analogy.
Id. at 13.
21 Day v. Bullen, 226 Ill.
72, 80 N.E. 739 (1907). The court felt that
the inclusion in the statute of the words "any person" was broad enough to
apply to legatees.
32 Martin v. Martin, 170 Ill. 18, 48 N.E. 694 (1897).
33 Kinney v. Keplinger, 172 Ill. 449, 50 N.E. 131 (1898). In this case,
one Sarah Clark was the executor of her husband's estate. Upon her death
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representative to
claimant who has been unable to get a personal
3 4
assets.
recover
to
proceedings
citation
initiate
An individual assumes numerous obligations when he applies for and accepts office as a personal representative in an estate. The foremost would be to avail himself of every remedy
provided by statute which enhances the estate, and he may be
held liable for his failure to marshal assets as well as to collect
debts due the estate.3 5 When the citation proceeding is initiated
by an "interested person" and someone other than the personal
representative is the respondent, the personal representative is
not a necessary party to the proceedings 6 although he or his
with
counsel is entitled to notice of all proceedings in compliance
3
7
Rules.
Court
Supreme
Illinois
the
of
spirit
and
intent
the
The Issuance of a Citation
The practice in the Probate Division, Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois, is that the presentation of a petition for the issuance of a citation is not unlike the presentation of any other
Motion of Course. The name of the estate and its sundry pertinent numbers of additional identification are entered on the "No
Notice Call" of the presiding judge of said probate division for
presentation on a day of counsel's choice. No notice to the respondent is necessary. When the petition is presented to the
presiding judge, counsel should have, prepared and in hand, an
order which commands the clerk of court to issue the citation directed to the named respondent and returnable on a day and at a
time certain. The citation process provided by counsel includes
she was succeeded by Kinney, and Keplinger was appointed the administrator
of her estates. When Keplinger failed to deliver the assets of Sarah Clark's
estate to Kinney, a citation proceeding was instituted. Keplinger contended
that by reason of Sarah Clark's possession of her husband's assets, her
estate be regarded as a debtor of the husband's estate, or of his legatees.
It was held that her position as executrix was more nearly that of a trustee
than that of a debtor.
4 Clark v. Hogle, 52 Ill. 427 (1869).
The court there noted:
The complainant . . . is entitled to call upon the administrator to show
what he has done with this estate; what assets, if any, there be, subject
to the payment of this debt, and in default thereof, compel payment out
of realty.
Id. at 432.
35 Nonnast v. Northern Trust Co., 374 Ill. 248, 29 N.E.2d 251 (1940).
It has been held many times that the citation procedure may not be utilized
to collect a debt, however, it seems logical that a personal representative
would be held responsible for the failure to recover property which clearly
belonged to the estate. An "executor occupies a fiduciary relationship to
the heirs and persons interested in the estate . . .". In re Estate of Lightner,
81 Ill. App. 2d 263, 274, 225 N.E.2d 417, 422 (1967).
36 Where an "interested person", within the meaning of the statute,
is convinced of the need to pursue a recovery from another person, and the
personal representative is not convinced and refuses to act, such "interested
person" has the right to initiate the proceedings in his own name and need
not name the personal representative as a respondent therein, for the reason
that no recovery is sought from the personal representative.
37 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11OA, §§1IA, 104(b) (1969).
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the name and address of the respondent, the return date, time
and courtroom, and what is expected of the respondent regarding
the production of documents. The clerk of court provides citation forms38 which are generally used but counsel may prepare
his own process.3 9 When recovery is sought by the petitioner, it
is advisable that sufficient insertions on the form be made which
are consistent with the prayer of the petition to apprise the respondent that he may be deprived of the possession of property.
When inserting the return date, which counsel chooses, he should
be cognizant of the provision which states that service be made
at least ten (10) or more days prior to the return day designated
40
in the citation.
When the order is signed commanding the issuance of the
citation, the courtroom clerk assigns a citation number to the
process and it is then recorded in the "Citation Docket" under
the return date so that the matter may be called in open court.
Counsel must then take a copy of the judge's order to the clerk's
office for the placing of the clerk's seal on the citation. Then
the citation must be taken by counsel to the sheriff's office and
placed for service upon the respondent. The sheriff makes his
return in accordance with the statute and returns the citation
to the courtroom stated on the citation form prior to the return
date stated thereon.
The service of the citation is what gives the court jurisdiction over the respondent. It is sufficiently important to repeat:
the citation should inform the respondent whether he is required
to appear for discovery or if property is to be recovered from his
possession, actual or constructive. In the absence of service of
the citation, the petition which obtained its issuance is just a
paper with empty, meaningless words awaiting life when service
of process is made.
When the matter is called on "return day," if service has
been made on the respondent, it is assigned by the presiding
judge to one of the judges assigned to the probate division.
Whether the matter will be heard on that day depends on many
variables. Usually the respondent appears without counsel,
wants time to employ counsel, and requests a continuance. Frequently, the judge to whom the citation is assigned is presiding
over another matter and must set a date for hearing on the citation. Infrequently, the respondent is ready for hearing and the
38 Circuit Court General Form CCG 5 (for discovery) and Circuit Court
Probate Form CCP68 (for discovery) are both adaptable for use in recovery
actions.
39 See for instance form 69, ILLINOIS UNIFORM PROBATE FORMS 91
(Burdette Smith Co. 1966).
40 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §183 (1969).
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court is able to accommodate all parties with a hearing on the
"return day."
As stated above the greater number of citations are for discovery and the matter proceeds to hearing without preliminary
motions or an answer to the pleading. An experienced "probate"
attorney, allowing for the primary purpose of the discovery citation, being fully cognizant of the "fishing" nature of the proceedings, considers it a time-saver to simply have the respondent
answer the oral interrogatories as soon as it is possible to have a
hearing. He also knows that at the conclusion of a hearing on a
citation for discovery, the order of court will be that the petition
is dismissed and the respondent is discharged.
Now and then reference is made to the respondent "not being discharged" and allowing petitioners to file a supplemental
petition for recovery. This is an injustice to a respondent because he is brought into court and then the rules are changed.
An order which goes beyond the provisions of the statute and is
broader than the issues raised in the petition is voidable."'
In In re Baker4 2 it was held that the order was necessarily
limited to the discovery of information although the petition
prayed for entry of "such orders as may be in the best interests
of the estate.... " 4
Is a Petition Necessary?
Although the statute recites that a citation shall issue "upon
the filing of a verified petition therefor. .. . ,44the proceedings
may be instituted and completed without the filing of a petition
and issuance and service of the process if the party-respondent
waives service and agrees to appear and be interrogated. 45 During the hearing on a routine motion in In re Gingolph,46 before
the presiding judge of the Probate Division, the personal representative through his counsel, orally charged that one of the interested parties present in the courtroom, a relative of the decedent, had in his possession or under his control property which
belonged to the estate. The charge was vehemently denied, and,
in a display of aching human emotions and predictable language
of a scandalized adversary, the person so charged agreed to ap41 Wilson v. Prochnow, 359 Il. 148, 194 N.E. 246 (1934) ; Tappy v.
Kilpatrick, 337 Ill.
600, 169 N.E. 739 (1929); In re Conservatorship of Baker,
79 Ill.App. 2d 234, 223 N.E.2d 744 (1967); Moser v. Feciura, 324 Il. App.
552, 58 N.E.2d 920 (1945).
42 In
re Conservatorship of Baker, 79 Il. App. 2d 234, 223 N.E.2d 744
(1967).
43 Id.
at 238, 223 N.E.2d at 747.
44
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, §183 (1969).
45 In
re Estate of Gingolph, 121 Ill.
App. 2d 32, 257 N.E.2d 238 (1970)
Hicks v. Monahan, 209 Il. App. 516 (1918).
46 121 Ill. App. 2d 32, 257 N.E.2d 238 (1970).
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pear at any time, any place and anywhere and give testimony to
prove that the charge was a lie. An order was entered which
recited:
This cause coming on to be heard upon the motion of Benjamin
Gingolph (sic) for notice of proceedings and matters regarding a
safe deposit box; and the oral motion of the Administrator for a
citation to discover assets to be issued against Benjamin Gingolph
forthwith, and it appearing that said Benjamin Gingolph has appeared in open court and he having engaged counsel who has appeared this date and entered their appearance instanter in regard

to said citation.
For good cause shown it is ordered that (1) A citation to discover assets is hereby issued against Benjamin Gingolph (sic)

instanter, and service of said citation having been waived by his

attorney, the hearing
on said citation is hereby assigned to . . .
47
for disposition.

Following entry of the order, and prior to the date set for
his appearance, Benjamin Gingold, as he called himself, returned
to his residence in Paris. A rule was entered for him to show
cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. After an
order adjudging him to be in contempt, he appealed contending
that "the lack of verified petition pursuant to Section 183 makes
the citation void since the trial court would have no jurisdiction
without a petition to enter a citation." Reciting the order set
out above, the reviewing court said that "[u]nder the circumstances we hold that it was proper for the trial court to permit
the appellant to waive strict compliance with section 183 regarding the filing of pleadings," and thereby upheld the ruling that
Gingold was in contempt of court. He is still in contempt, because when last heard of, Benjamin Gingold was alive and well
and living in Paris with or without the assets of the decedent, depending on the truth or falsity of the administrator's charge.
Because the proceeding is purely statutory, it has been held
that it should be in strict compliance with the statute.48 The
Gingolph proceeding was for discovery only. It could be argued that the requirements of the statute could not be effectively
waived if the petitioner was seeking a recovery of property. The
facts must be alleged so that the respondent may form his defense. Undoubtedly the respondent could waive service upon
himself and submit to the jurisdiction of the court as in all other
types of litigation, but if looking at citations in the perspective
of litigation which leads to judgments, it is doubtful the proceedings could be instituted for recovery without a written and
verified petition.
Id.
In re Estate of Rackliffe, 366 I1. 22, 7 N.E.2d 754 (1937); Urban
v. Hynes, 285 I1. App. 182, 1 N.E.2d 885 (1936).
47
48
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The respondent may choose not to file an answer.4 9 Should
the respondent choose to file an answer denying the crucial allegation of the petition, the result would be only an admission of
those allegations not denied and thereby not important to respondent's defense: the answer is not evidence and denial of
possession of the property which is the subject of the proceedings is a conclusion of the pleader.0
The petitioner may initiate successive citations for discovery
against the same respondent, limited only by not being unreasonable or abusive by doing so. The petitioner may also amend
the petition at any time. 51
THE HEARING - THE RESPONDENT AS A WITNESS
The statute provides that:
At the hearing the court may examine the respondent on oath
whether or not the petitioner has proved the matters alleged in the
petition, may hear the evidence offered by any party, may determine all questions of title, claims of adverse title, and the right of
property....

52

The petitioner assumes the burden of proceeding and the
burden of proof. The respondent is the court's witness, 3 since
it is the court's process which brought him before the court. In
assuming his burden of proceeding, the petitioner may call the
respondent as his witness under a provision of the Civil Practice
Act,' 4 or he may proceed to prove the allegations of his petition
for recovery without the testimony of the respondent.
Where a respondent defended on the ground of a gift of the
property from the decedent, he was not allowed to testify of his
own motion by reason of the dead-man statute." On a similar
defense the respondent in another matter was permitted to testify.56 It could be argued that if the petitioner assumed and successfully carried his burden of proof without calling the respondent as a witness, the dead-man statute should apply. There
is merit to the argument that to prohibit the testimony of a re41 Hicks v. Monahan, 209 Ill. App. 516 (1918) ; Mohlke v. People ex rel.
Moore,
50 117 Ill. App. 595 (1905).
1n re Estate of Halaska, 307 Ill. App. 176, 30 N.E.2d 119 (1940).
51 Blair v. Sennott, 134 Ill. 78, 24 N.E. 969 (1890).

52 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §185 (1969).

53/d.
54 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §60 (1969).
55 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, §2 (1969); of. Scianna v. Scianna, 69 Ill. App.
2d 388, 217 N.E.2d 101 (1966), where the affidavit of a party in opposition
to the personal representative was held inadmissable. Johnson v. Mueller,

346 Ill. App. 199, 104 N.E.2d 651 (1952).
56 Storr v. Storr, 329 Ill. App. 537, 69 N.E.2d 916 (1946) ; In re Estate
of Halaska, 307 Ill. App. 176, 30 N.E.2d 119 (1940) ; Merchants' Loan and
Trust Co. v. Egan, 222 Ill. 494, 78 N.E. 800 (1906); Wade v. Pritchard, 69
Ill. 279 (1873), wherein the court stated that it is discretionary with the court
whether the party alleged to have property shall be examined under oath

since it is the court which calls him.
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spondent who was the only person privy to a transaction or occurrence may be a grave injustice. The courts of Illinois have
given the dead-man statute a strict interpretation,57 although it
has been held that it must be given a reasonable interpretation
which would be fair to the parties involved. 8 The allowance of
testimony by the respondent lies within the careful exercise of
the discretion of the trial court." Since one of the dead-man
statute's primary purposes is to place the parties on an equal
footing, 60 if the petitioner has made a prima facie case for recovery, the respondent should be allowed to testify to prevent a
procedural and substantive injustice. Regardless of the procedural strategy employed by the petitioner, the respondent may
be called to testify by the court. 61 The interrogation of the respondent by the court, when called as a witness by the court,
should not expand the testimony of the respondent beyond the
limits raised by the petitioner.2 Of course, the respondent is
permitted to testify regarding any issue raised by the petitioner
63
as an exception to the basic rule.
The court is empowered to determine all questions of right
of property.6 4 All too familiar is the layman's phrase that possession is nine-tenths of the law. Perhaps the quantum the layman attributes to legal possession is debatable, but possession is
a strong presumption of ownership and must be rebutted.1 The
many factual situations which give rise to presumptions, burdens
of proof and the principles to be applied are hereinafter discussed.
The statute also provides for the enforcement powers of the
court with regard to its orders or judgment."' The power of the
court to commit to jail a respondent who refuses to answer pertinent questions put to him, or who refuses to deliver to the petitioner, or the estate as the case may dictate, the property which
the court has found or ruled belongs to such petitioner is a necessary and intimidating power.
57

S.

GARD, ILLINOIS EVIDENCE MANUAL

500 (5th ed. 1963).

58 Pink v. Dempsey, 350 Ill. App. 405, 113 N.E.2d 334

(1953).
59 Wagner v. Wagner, 17 Ill. App. 2d 307, 149 N.E.2d 770 (1958).
60 Vancuren v. Vancuren, 348 Ill. App. 351, 109 N.E.2d

225 (1952);

Firke v. McClure, 389 Ill. 543, 60 N.E.2d 220 (1945).
61 Storr v. Storr, 329 Ill. App. 537, 69 N.E.2d 916 (1946) ; Price v. Meier,
324 Ill. App. 313, 58 N.E.2d 197 (1944); In re Estate of Harwood 193 Ill.
App. 514 (1915); Mahoney v. People ex rel. Patteson, 98 Ill. !ipp. 241
(1901)
6 2 ; Estate of Kraher v. Launtz 90 Il. App. 496 (1900).
In re Estate of Breen, 329 ill. App. 650, 70 N.E.2d 90 (1946).
63 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, §2 (1969).
64 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §185 (1969).
65 Martin v. Martin, 174 Ill. 371, 51 N.E. 691 (1898) ; In re Estate of
Kreshner, 304 Ill. App. 640, 26 N.E.2d 529 (1940).
66 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §185 (1969).
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JUDGE OR JURY

Upon the demand of any party to the proceedings, the determination of title, claims of title, and the right to property in
question shall be made by a jury.6" This right was not available
to the parties prior to the enactment of the Probate Act.s In
accordance with the provisions of the Probate Act, 69 the choosing
of a jury is in accordance with the Civil Practice Act. 0 In a
matter in which the court is asked to determine the title or the
right of property, it is reversible error to deny a trial by jury.71
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES AS THE RESPONDENT
The final provision of Article XV72 provides a remedy for
any person who claims ownership of property inventoried by a
personal representative. The law grants to such other person
all of the rights given to the personal representative in the preceding sections, including the right to trial by jury.
Infrequently, the citation proceeding is instituted by "another person" naming the personal representative as the respondent who has in his possession property which belonged to
the decedent, or ward, which property he refuses to include in
his inventory filed pursuant to statute.7 3 When such is the case
the court may appoint, and should be moved to do so, a guardian
ad litem or special administrator to appear on behalf of and
represent the estate. When the parties are so situated, the personal representative is a respondent in his individual capacity ;74
usually because he claims the property as his own.71 Since his
interest is inimical to the estate, the estate must be fairly represented. Sometimes such a petitioner may have a speedier resolution of the controversy by filing objections to the inventory filed
by the personal representative. Occasional reports, most of
them old ones, have dealt with the litigation of objections to inventories as a remedy for getting the question of ownership of
property resolved where the personal representative has claimed
the ownership.76 It was suggested once that the simplest pro67Id. §186.
68 Martin v. Martin, 170 Ill. 18, 48 N.E. 694 (1897).
69
7o
71

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §5 (1969).
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §190 (1969).
Keshner v. Keshner 376 IIl. 354, 33 N.E.2d 877 (1941) ; Hansen v.

Swartz, 345 Ill. 609, 178 N.1. 246 (1931).
72
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §5 (1969).
73

Id. §171.

74 Dubach v. Jolly, 279 Ill. 530, 117 N.E. 77 (1917).
75 Heinrich v. Harrigan, 288 Ill 170 123 N.E. 309 (1919).
76In re Estate of Toigo, 107 Ill. kpp. 2d 395, 246 N.E.2d 68 (1969);
Estate of Harwood v. Harwood, 193 Ill. App. 514 (1915); Emerick v.
Hileman, 177 Ill. 368, 52 N.E. 311 (1898); Simms v. Guess, 52 Ill. App.
543 (1893) ; see In re Estate of Sacks, 89 Ill. App. 2d 1 (1967), where the
proceedings were instituted to compel the personal representative to inventory stock interest.
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cedure to be used by a personal representative who claims ownership is to inventory such property or asset and make notations
thereon that he claims that asset.7" The Horner book, Probate
Practice & Estates, points out that the procedure of objecting
to the inventory should only be employed where the personal representative has not attempted to conceal the asset or his interest,
and where the person who is a probable petitioner in citation, or
objection to the inventory, has knowledge of the existence of the
asset. An order to inventory property is only interlocutory and
does not adjudicate the right to it.18 The "either-or" choice is
practical only where all parties agree on the facts.
THE PLEADING, THE THEORY, AND THE RESPONDENT IMPORTANCE OF THE INTERRELATIONSHIP

THE

With regard to the petition, the pleader must adopt and allege his theory for recovery of property; this is of threshold importance. As in other adversary civil matters wherein the party
initiating the litigation and praying for a recovery must state a
cause of action, so too must the petitioner allege facts which support his prayer for relief. Should it appear from the petition
and its allegations that the petitioner has no basis for recovery,
a motion to strike and/or dismiss the proceedings may be filed
and the respondent heard on the purely legal question of sufficiency of the petition. The petition for the issuance of a citation
for recovery of property is not unlike a complaint at law or in
equity. All of the provisions of the Civil Practice Act 9 and Rules
of the Supreme Court 0 regarding pleadings apply. All parties
to the proceedings have a right, as in all other civil matters, to
use and employ the discovery provisions of the Civil Practice
82
Act"' and the Supreme Court Rules.
When drafting the petition for recovery, the pleader should
be sure to include as respondents all persons who are necessary
for a final recovery of the property which is the subject matter
of the planned proceeding. If the subject matter is property in
the possession and custody of an individual, then such custodian
should be a respondent.8 3 If the subject matter is funds on deposit in a financial institution or credit union, it is necessary to
make the financial institution or credit union a respondent together with all persons who claim a right to the funds. Usually,
the need for a citation arises because the financial institution
77 Simms v. Guess, 52 Ill. App. 543 (1893);
PRACTICE AND ESTATES 288 (1940).
78 Simms v. Guess, 52 Ill. App. 543 (1893).
7
9 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§31-48 (1969).
80 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §§131-80 (1969).
81 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §58 (1969).
82 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §§201-30 (1969).
83

H. HORNER, PROBATE

In re Estate of Garrett, 81 Ill. App. 2d 141, 224 N.E.2d 654 (1967).
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which has the funds on deposit has informed all parties who have
claimed the funds that it wants and will abide by a court order
as to the true ownership of the funds. To assure a compliance
with the final order determining ownership, the depositary must
be made a respondent. Where property has been delivered by a
proposed respondent to a third person, that person as custodian,
who claims ownership through the proposed respondent, should
be made a respondent. Where a person who is a respondent
once had property and conveyed it to a third person, the grantee
of such property should be a respondent too. In short, to effect
recovery of property, the respondent against whom judgment is
entered must have the power or legal obligation to make a de4
livery to the petitioner.
As happens very often, where a depositary has delivered
funds of an account to a surviving joint owner, the depositary
should be a respondent in a citation proceeding for discovery.
Then the petitioner is able to acquaint himself with the necessary
facts for the development of his theory for recovery, prepare a
sufficient petition and effectively present his "case" at the hearing. Most all banks and savings and loan associations will voluntarily provide a personal representative with copies of the
signature cards and other information regarding the creation
and status of the account. Presuming counsel has all the facts,
then he need consider an agent of the depositary only as a necessary witness upon the hearing on the merits.
By statute all banks and savings and loan institutions are
protected against liability for having delivered funds on deposit
to a person named as a joint owner with right of survivorship
to the funds.8 5 No such protection extends to the institution
where payment is made to a personal representative and there is
a surviving joint owner. When such circumstances exist, then
the depositary should be a respondent so that if petitioner is successful, he may pursue collection against the depositary and
leave the depositary to pursue recoupment from the legal representative. Where the depositary is informed of a depositor's
death, and subsequently delivers funds pursuant to a withdrawal
slip signed by the depositor prior to his death, the citation should
be directed against the person who withdrew the funds and the
bank; the bank is not protected then by the statute. 86 The overriding element in the determination of who should be the respondent, or respondents is petitioner's theory as to against
whom he can sustain a basis for recovery, and the probability of
effecting that recovery.
8
4 In re Estate of Porter, 43 Ill. App. 2d 416, 193 N.E.2d 617 (1963).
85 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 76, §2(a) (1969).

86 Id.
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An interesting legal question arose in a citation matter at
the trial court level where the petitioner sought recovery of a
trust deed and not from decedent's estate on the theory that petitioner had advanced funds for a mortgage, the payment of
which was secured by said instruments. The decedent had been
an officer and stockholder of a bank which had become insolvent
and had its depositors paid by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. Upon learning of the citation proceeding, the
FDIC, on its motion, was granted leave to intervene. The petitioner filed a motion to strike and dismiss the FDIC petition for
recovery on the ground that the federal agency had no right to
the instruments, or rights therein, until such time as there was a
legal determination made that the instruments were assets of
the decedent's estate. If the intervenor had a right to the property which was superior to that of the original petitioner, regardless of the original petitioner's interest, then the FDIC must
be allowed to intervene,17 and the provisions of the Commercial
Code88 were not applicable.
But the personal representative did not consider himself to
be a bailee, and maintained that the documents properly belonged
to the decedent's estate. Since the proceedings did not originate
as an action in replevin, the provisions applicable to such an
action did not apply. 89 The Civil Practice Act provisions applicable to parties and interpleader ° did not apply because a finding
for the petitioner, against the personal representative, would not
expose the personal representative to "double or multiple liability."
Fundamentally, it would strain the construction of the citation statute to permit the adjudication of title to property between one who claims ownership and one who claims a lien
thereon. The applicable Illinois constitutional provision,9 1 the
subsequently enacted statutes 92 and rules9- designed to accomplish the objectives of the constitutional article, i.e., to consolidate the various courts and expedite litigation, was not a just
and sufficient reason to impose upon the petitioner, who was not
the personal representative, the preparation and defense against
the allegation, claim and proof to be offered of the lien holder or
claimant by virtue of a liability of the decedent which was only
remotely related to the asset. In anticipation, if the court had
found that the property belonged to the initial petitioner, the in87

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, §29 (1969).

88 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26,
89

§§7-603 (1969).

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 119, §22(a) (1969).
1o ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §26.2 (1969).
91 ILL. CONST. art. VI,

§1 (1870).

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §21 (1969).
88 Id.
92
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tervention of the federal agency would have caused undue delay
in the adjudication of petitioner's recovery.
In a matter where notes were payable to the decedent but
were in the possession of an equitable owner, and said notes
were not necessary to pay the debts of the estate, recovery by
the administrator was denied.9 4 The court has an obligation to
protect the equitable owner and "if an order can accomplish no
substantial good, it should not be made."9 5 In practical application such positions are possible when the equitable owner concedes the interest of the payee, or vice versa. Applying those
theories to the FDIC situation, ownership of the documents was
not of importance to the personal representative, the petitioner
was entitled to protection, and permitting the federal agency to
intervene where the documents truly belonged to the petitioner
could not accomplish any "good."
If the asset in the hands of another, who has lawful possession, is not needed by the personal representative to administer
the estate, the personal representative need only assign the decedent's interest in the asset to the heir, or heirs, or legatee who
is entitled to the distribution of decedent's assets.
A petitioner may not avail himself of the citation remedy
for the collection of a debt.9 6 Where the respondent owes a debt
to the ward or owed a debt, unpaid, to the decedent, the personal
representative must pursue an action at law. Where the petitioner has a demand against the estate which matured out of a
debtor-creditor relationship, the remedy is to pursue a claim in
accordance with statute.9 7
The pleader for the issuance of a citation should be thoroughly familiar with the various legal principles as they apply
to gifts, both inter vivos and causa mortis. The theory of the
petitioner for recovery is of the utmost importance. If the
transfer is determined to be a gift to the respondent, he maintains possession. If, however, the respondent is found to hold
the property only for the convenience of the decedent or as a
trustee, the petitioner must prevail. The theory for recovery
must be arrived at in the light of the property to be recovered
and the circumstances surrounding the transfer of the property.
94 People ex rel. McKee v. Abbott 105 Ill.
588 (1883).

4 W. JAMES, ILLINOIS PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE (1st ed. 1951).
App. 2d 332, 253 N.E.2d 501
96 In 'e Conservatorship of Baker, 117 Ill.
9

(1969); Dawdy v. Strickland, 378 Ill. 230, 37 N.E.2d 817 (1941); Johnson
v. Nelson, 341 Ill. 119, 173 N.E. 77 (1930) ; eee In re Estate of George, 335
Ill. App. 509, 82 N.E.2d 365 (1948), where the estate defended on the grounds
that the petitioner's action was a claim. In Oliver v. Crook, 321 Ill. App.
55, 52 N.E.2d 453 (1943), the moving party's alleged claim was not a claim
within the purview of ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3,§204 (1943).

97LL.REV. STAT. ch. 3, §192 (1969).
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The reported cases have as the subject matter such diverse types
01
of property as savings accounts,9 8 cash,99 bonds, 10 stocks, cer04
10
10 2
real estate, 3 proceeds of checks, credit
tificates of deposit,
union interests,0 0 partnership interests, 10 and furniture. 10 7 Once
long ago, the citation procedure was utilized for the recovery of
human beings.108 In Frey v. Wubbena 0 the Illinois Supreme
Court said: "[t]his case involves a wide variety of personal
property interests and brings into sharp focus most of the
troublesome problems which the concept of survivorship with respect to personality has presented to the courts."" 0
One matter, although involving a savings account, illustrates
an unusual problem and needs a separate classification. The author has, upon occasion, referred to this case as the "Russian
Roulette Account." During his lifetime the decedent had created
a joint bank account with his spouse. Not long after her death,
he changed it by adding the name of his then lady-friend as a
joint owner with the right of survivorship. Within a short period
App. 2d 83, 256 N.E.2d 113 (1970) ;
98 In re Estate of Watson 120 Ill.
App. 2d 267, 250 N.E.2d 295 (1969) ; In re
In re Estate of Skinner, 111 Ill.
Estate of Foster, 104 Ill. App. 2d 447, 244 N.E.2d 620 (1969) ; Roth v. Roth,
96 Ill. App. 2d 292 238 N.E.2d 607 (1968); In re Estate of Bors, 83 Ill.
App. 2d 447, 228 N.E.2d 127 (1967) ; In re Estate of Weaver, 75 Ill. App. 2d
App. 2d 314, 218
227, 220 N.E.2d 321 (1966) ; In re Estate of Stang, 71 Ill.
2d 156, 210
N.E.2d 854 (1966); Dixon National Bank v. Morris, 33 Ill.
N.E.2d 505 (1965); Murgic v. Granite City Trust and Savings Bank, 31
Ill. 2d 587, 202 N.E.2d 470 (1964); Frey v. Wubbena, 26 Ill. 2d 62, 185
N.E.2d 850 (1962); Schneider v. Schneider, 6 Ill. 2d 180, 127 N.E.2d 445
(1955) ; In re Estate of Artrowski, 286 Ill. App. 184, 3 N.E.2d 132 (1936).
99 Kirkham v. Halford, 83 Ill. App. 300, 227 N.E.2d 527 (1967) ; In re
App. 2d 141 224 N.E.2d 654 (1967).
Estate of Garrett, 81 Ill.
100 Kellner v. First Trust and Savings Bank, 40 Ill. App. 2d 371, 189
N.E.2d 766 (1963) ; Frey v. Wubbena, 26 Ill. 2d 62, 185 N.E.2d 850 (1962);
Levites v. Levites, 27 Ill. App. 2d 274 169 N.E.2d 574 (1960).
101 In re Estate of Skinner, 111 ill. App. 2d 267,250 N.E.2d 295 (1969);
In re Estate of Toigo, 107 Il. App. 2d 395, 246 N.E.2d 68 (1969) ; Chiribes
v. Bjorvik, 100 Ill. App. 2d 150, 241 N.E.2d 626 (1968); In re Estate of
App. 2d 230 240 N.E.2d 740 (1968) ; In re Estate of Habel,
Pokorney, 99 Ill.
App. 2d 194, 231 N.E.2d 616 (1967); In re Estate of Stang, 71 Ill.
88 Ill.
App. 2d 314, 218 N.E.2d 854 (1966) ; see also Doherty, Corporate Stock in
Joint Tenancy - Right of Sunrvivor 4 J.M.L.Q. 169 (1938).
App. 300, 227 N.E.2d 527 (1967).
102 Kirkham v. Halford, 83 Ill.
re Estate of Garrett, 81 I. App. 2d 141, 224 N.E.2d 654 (1967);
103 In
In re Estate of Bichl, 65 Ill. App. 2d 3, 213 N.E.2d 83 (1968).
lO4In re Estate of Oppenheim, 63 Ill. App. 2d 284, 211 N.E.2d 403
(1965).
App. 2d 362, 243 N.E. 2d 1 (1968);
10 In re Estate of Dawson, 103 Ill.
Armstrong v. Daniel, 88 Ill. App. 2d 31, 232 N.E.2d 218 (1967).
106 Frey v. Wubbena, 26 Ill. 62 185 N.E.2d 850 (1962).
App. 2d 305, 232 N.E.2d 310 (1967);
107 In
re Estate of Smith, 90 Ill.
207, 88 N.E.2d 662 (1949).
In re Estate of Wilson, 404 Ill.
108 Ashley's Adm'rs v. Denton, 1 Litt. 86 (Ky. Ct. App. 1822).
109 26 Ill. 2d 62, 185 N.E.2d 850 (1962).
"o Id. at 65, 185 N.E.2d at 853. There have been many other types
of property which have been the subjects of the citation proceeding which
did not reach the reviewing court: jewelry, photographs, furniture, and
sentimental items of every imaginable description. Sometimes relatives
initiate the citation proceedings seeking revenge rather than justice and in
such a case, the property subject itself is immaterial.
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of time, he changed the account so that the new joint owner with
the right of survivorship was a new lady-friend in his favor.
There were several ladies involved with "repeaters" among the
joint owners. As in Russian Roulette, when the decedent's loaded
chamber came up, the then joint owner with the right of survivorship was a lady-friend unknown to and disliked by the other
lady-friends who knew each other and who had knowledge of the
changes in the account. A daughter of the decedent instituted

a citation proceeding against the surviving joint owner and on
the hearing produced as petitioner's witnesses all of the other

former girl friends of the decedent; four in number. The question arose as to whether this was an account for convenience or
whether decedent possessed donative intent. It was held that
frequent changes suggest a fitting pattern of convenience and
indicate no intention of an ultimate gift to the joint tenant.11 '
TYPES OF PROPERTY TO BE RECOVERED

For a clearer understanding of the theories, presumptions
and proof required as applicable to the proceedings for recovery
of various types of property, each classification or type of property shall be considered separately.
Savings accounts
Illinois law provides as follows:
(a) When a deposit in any bank or trust company transacting
business in this State has been made or shall hereafter be made in
the names of two or more persons payable to them when the account is opened or thereafter, such deposit or any part thereof or
any interest or dividend thereon may be paid to any one of said
persons whether the other or others be living or not, and when an
agreement permitting such payment is signed by all said persons
at the time the account is opened or thereafter the receipt or acquittance of the person so paid shall be valid and sufficient discharge from all parties to the bank for any payments so made .112
This statutory provision is an exception to the statute which
abolished joint tenancies with the right of survivorship in personal property.113
111 In re Estate of Weaver, 75 Ill. App. 2d 227, 220 N.E.2d 321 (1966).
In another trial level citation matter, a brother of the decedent maintained
that he was told by a bank official that he could collect the decedent's savings,
which were in excess of $8,000.00, if he submitted a surety bond. This he
did and then withdrew the funds. At the hearing he admitted withdrawing
the funds but stated that he had lost them gambling. On cross-examination
it was established that he incurred a gambling debt in Las Vegas prior
to withdrawal of the money in question. He had gambled on credit and paid
off the debt with the money which was the subject of the citation controversy.
Another trial level matter further illustrates the emotionalism and distrust which such citation proceedings can cause. One female petitioner
attacked her brother, the respondent, from behind, battering him with her
purse. The citation proceeding was temporarily interrupted as the respondent had to be taken by ambulance to the hospital.
112 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 76, §2(a) (1969).
I's Id.
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The inclination was at common law that where there were
no words which indicated the property was not in joint tenancy,
the property was regarded as an estate in joint tenancy with the
right of survivorship.

One reason given for such holdings 14 is that this result was
a carry over from feudalism. However, this does not appear to
have been the primary factor. It would appear that early reasoning was that if the so-called "unities" existed, the parties
could not have intended to create anything other than a joint
tenancy since they could have easily divided the property.

Consistent with other provisions of the Joint Rights and Obligations statute, 115 the above mentioned Section 2 (a) makes it
possible to create a joint ownership of funds so deposited with
the right of survivorship notwithstanding that the initial depositor is named as one of the joint owners. The common law
concept of the four unities is destroyed and the intervention of a
third party, the "straw man" is unnecessary."16
In a literal construction of a section of the statute"

7

as it

pertains to corporate stock, a federal court found that the statute
was enacted only to limit the liability of corporations as to transfers of stock held jointly."" While the language of Section 2 (a)
is different, necessarily, a court would engage in strained construction to hold that the intent and spirit of sections 2 (a) and
2(b) are incongruous. In construing the statute as it pertains
to banks and savings accounts and what was intended, it has
been held that the statute goes further than providing a protection for the bank in making payment to one of the joint owners or depositors. The court held that it also provided a statutory vehicle for the creation of joint accounts with the right of
survivorship- 9 which is the essential characteristic of an estate
of joint tenancy. 120 By freeing the bank of liability when it pays
out to a survivor, if the law is to have any meaning and reason,
it follows logically that as between the bank and the survivor, the
survivor is entitled to the funds.
When the subject of a citation for recovery is a savings or
checking account, the petition should allege the name of the de114 In Shipley v. Shipley, 324 Ill. 560, 155 N.E. 334 (1927), the court
said: "This leaning in favor of joint tenancies grew out of a desire to lessen
the feudal burdens of the tenants since, only one suit and service was due
from all the joint tenants." Id. at 560, 155 N.E. at 335.
115 ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 76, §1 (1969).
116 Frey v. Wubbena, 26 Il1. 2d 62, 185 N.E.2d 850 (1962).
"17 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 76, §2(b) (1969).
118 Petri v. Rhein, 162 F. Supp. 834 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 257 F.2d 268
(7th Cir. 1958).
In re Vollmer's Estate, 45 Ill. App. 2d 294, 195 N.E.2d 44 (1964).
120Welsh v. James, 404 Ill. 18, 95 N.E.2d 872 (1951); Patridge v.
Berliner, 325 Ill. 253, 156 N.E. 352 (1927). For a discussion of the principles

of constructive and resulting trusts, see the text at note 188 infra,.
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positary, type of account, number of the account, title thereof
and the amount sought to be recovered. As stated hereinbefore,
if the funds have been paid to a survivor, or to survivors, the
financial institution that released the funds is protected by statute from liability for having so released the funds, and the petition should name as the respondent the survivor, or survivors.
Great care should be exercised in determining if the account was
the type which afforded the bank the statutory protection in making payment to the survivor. If the petitioner knows, either
through personal knowledge or as the result of discovery, that
the funds are in the possession or under the control of another
person or institution, then such other person or institution should
be made a party respondent. A final and binding adjudication
can be made only if the rights and claims of all persons involved
are litigated. If the funds are still on deposit with the bank or
trust company which created the account, then the bank or trust
company and all who make a claim to the funds ought to be party
respondents.
To determine whether the survivor or the estate has the
right to the funds on deposit in the joint account or already in
the possession of the survivor, the issue has loosely been stated
to be whether there was donative intent in providing the funds
or whether the account was created for convenience only. The
donative intent to be determined must have existed at the time
the joint account was created, or clear and convincing proof must
be offered that subsequent to the creation of the account, the
decedent made it known that it was his intent to create survivorship rights in the account. If such is the case, the donative in2
tent relates back to the time of the creation of the account.1 '
This by no means imports a gift causa mortis. The essentials
of a gift causa mortis are: the execution of a document by the
donor in anticipation of death; the gift to be effective only upon
12
donor's death; and actual delivery of the property.
Under the provision of the Joint Rights and Obligations
statute, 123 and the presumption which arises thereunder, the gift
is not delayed since the bank or trust company may pay out the
funds to either or both of the parties during their life time. The
courts will not apply the presumption that there was a gift, but
121 The court in In re Estate of Stang, 71 Ill. App. 2d 314, 218 N.E.2d
854 (1966) said: "The evidence of donative intent must focus upon or relate
back to the time of the creation of the joint tenancy". Id. at 817, 218 N.E.2d

at 855. The Stang court considered the provisions of the decedent's will in
order to ascertain his intent in the premises.

122 Taylor v. Harmison, 179 Ill. 137, 53 N.E. 584 (1899); Williams v.
Chamberlain, 165 I1. 610, 46 N.E. 250 (1896).
123 ILL. Rsv. STAT. ch. 76, §2 (1969).
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they will indulge in the presumption that the decedent who provided the funds deposited had a donative intent.12
In Erwin v. Felter125 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that
the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction which
took place between the joint depositors and the financial institution may and should be inquired into for the purpose of aiding
the court in making a determination regarding the intention of
the parties. 126 The holding in Erwin v. Felter was followed both
as to procedure and substance in citation proceedings for many
years.
In Schneider v. Schneider,1 27 on the subject of the controversy surrounding ownership of the proceeds of a savings account, it was held that "[t]o establish a gift, the proof must be
clear and convincing, and the burden is upon the alleged donee
to establish the existence of a donative intent." The court went
on to say that "[t]he form of the [bank] agreement . . .is not
conclusive as to the intention of the depositors between themselves. '128 As a result of that ruling, rendered in 1955, the survivor of a joint account with a right of survivorship was thereby
compelled to assume and carry the burden of proving that there
was a donative intent on the part of the deceased joint owner
when the account was created, or a subsequent intent which
would relate back to that time. In a dissenting opinion, Mr.
1 29
Justice Hershey stated that in an appellate court opinion
wherein the facts were identical except as to the parties, the institution, and the amount involved, it was held that the rights
of the parties were created by contract (agreement with the
bank), and the respondent had to look to that contract for her
rights. The appellate court had said it was improper to admit
parol evidence to show an intention contrary to what was
stated in the agreement. The agreement entered into at the
creation of the account was not then, and is not now, a third
party beneficiary contract, because it would be a grave error to
presume that the contract was for the benefit of the survivor.
It would be equally erroneous to consider it a bequest because
the document as executed failed to meet the requirements for
the making of an effective will.2 3
Thus in the Schneider matter, the court abandoned the contract theory and the rules of evidence applicable thereto. Hold124 Murgic v. Granite City Trust and Savings Bank, 31 Ill.
2d 587, 202
N.E.2d 470 (1964).
125 283 Il. 36, 119 N.E. 926 (1918).
126

127
128
129

Id.

Schneider v. Schneider, 6 II. 2d 180, 127 N.E.2d 445 (1955).
Id. at 187, 127 N.E.2d at 449.
In re Estate of McGrath, 276 Ill.
App. 408 (1934).

130ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §43 (1969).
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ing that parol evidence was admissible to show the absence of
a donative intent, it placed a burden on the respondent to prove
such intent on the part of the decedent. Therefore, the respondent entered upon his defense of a citation for recovery in such
matters without the benefit of a presumption or the implications
derived from the language of the agreement executed at the time
the joint account was created. The testimony given at the trial
in Schneider was that the decedent said to the respondent, "I
want your name on these bank accounts so that in case I am sick
you can go and get the money for me."''31 That admission by the
respondent was sufficient for the court to find that the decedent,
who provided all of the funds for the accounts, did not have as a
state of mind a donative intent when the accounts were created
nor did anything occur thereafter which could prove that the account was anything but one created for the convenience of the
decedent. On the facts, the ruling in Schneider would in all
probability be the ruling in a current citation controversy. However, it is no longer the law that "to establish a right, the proof
must be clear and convincing . . .and the burden is upon the
alleged donee to establish the existence of a donative intent.
"132

In 1964 the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed itself as to
the initial legal position of the alleged donee in a citation proceeding. 133 It set standards of presumption and burdens of proof
which abrogated some of the principles established by the Schneider opinion. It stated that "Public policy would seem to-require
the adoption by the courts of a more liberal and practical view
of these [joint accounts] common transactions." The court went
on to say:
... the estate or other person claiming against the survivor
should have the burden of disproving intent on the part of the decedent, and the degree of proof to void the presumption should be
2d 180, 127 N.E.2d 445 (1955), the
131 In Schneider v. Schneider, 6 Ill.
decedent withdrew funds from a savings account, and at the same financial
institution created two joint accounts in his name and that of the respondent.
The signature cards provided for "right of survivorship". The Probate Court
of Cook County, Illinois, dismissed the estate's petition praying for recovery
of the funds. On appeal and a trial de novo, the Superior Court of Cook
County, Illinois, ruled that the funds belonged to the estate, which ruling
was affirmed on appeal.
132 Id. at 187, 127 N.E.2d at 449.
2d 587,
133 In Murgic v. Granite City Trust and Savings Bank, 31 Ill.
202 N.E.2d 470 (1964), the decedent deposited funds in a joint savings
account with right of survivorship with one Peter Murgic as his joint owner
or depositor. An official of the bank had explained to both the decedent
and to Peter Murgic the legal effect and ramifications of such an account.
The testimony was that the decedent stated that Murgic was his friend
and he wanted the said Murgic to have the funds if he pre-deceased Murgic.
They signed an agreement and after some discussion as to who was to have
the passbook it was delivered to the decedent. Unknown to Peter Murgic,
additional funds were deposited in the account by the decedent. The trial
court found for Peter Murgic by entry of judgment on a jury verdict.
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To hold that a lesser degree is required
clear and convincing....
or that the burden shifted [from the Administrator to Murgic]

would
would tend to make every joint tenancy account suspect and
34
promote instability rather than stability of ownership.

In clear and concise language, the supreme court said:
We hold that an instrument creating a joint account under the
statutes presumably speaks the whole truth; and, in order to go
behind the terms of the agreement, the one claiming adversely
thereto has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing
does not shift
evidence that a gift was not intended. This13burden
5
to the party claiming under the agreement.

Admitting the clarity and conciseness of the court, it bears
repeating in another way - the survivor enters into the proceedings deep in the luxury of a presumption that his now deceased joint owner intended to make a gift of the funds, and the
petitioner claiming the funds must assume the burden of rebutting that presumption. Upon a clear and convincing proof of

the creation of an account for convenience, as in the Schneider
matter, the presumption might be rebutted, but under present
law and theory the respondent in Schneider would not assume
the burden of clear and convincing proof that the decedent had
a donative intent, as was the ruling. The presumption, as any
other legal presumption, is obligatory on the court, and obligatory on a jury if such is the case.
Clear and convincing evidence has been held to be the quantum of proof which leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of
the trier of the facts of the trust of the fact, or facts, which are

in issue.

36

In the interim period between the Schneider matter and the
Murgic matter, the supreme court determined that in Schneider,
it was "concerned only with the rights of depositors between
themselves and, irrespective of the equities between them, the
in
savings association would be protected in making payments
137

accordance with the terms of the deposit agreement.'

"34 Id. at 590, 202 N.E.2d at 471.
After deciding Murgi, the Illinois
Supreme Court found it necessary to decide Dixon National Bank v. Morris,
33 Ill. 2d 156, 210 N.E.2d 505 (1965), because in the lower court, Dixon
National Bank v. Morris, 51 Ill. App. 2d 284, 201 N.E.2d 248 (1964), the
initial position of the surviving joint owner was rendered as unstable as
was the position of the respondent in Schneider.
135 The issue might be raised as to whether the deceased joint owner
was capable of forming the necessary donative intent. To be consistent
with the law regarding the testimentary capacity of a testator, of importance
is the cause of and the type of incompetence and whether the alleged incompetence was of sufficient magnitude to throttle effective intent.
136 Galapeaux v. Orviller, 4 Ill. 2d 442, 123 N.E.2d 321 (1954) ; Finney v.
374, 59 N.E.2d 859 (1945); Cravens v. Hubble, 375 Ill. 51,
White 389 Ill.
30 N.E.2d 622 (1940); Northerest, Inc. v. Walker Bank and Trust Co., 122
Utah 268, 248 P.2d 692 (1952) ; Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212
P.2d 194 (1949); In re Chappel, 33 N.E.2d 393 (Ohio App. 1938); Merrick
v. Ditzler, 91 Ohio St. 256, 110 N.E. 493 (1915).
187 Frey v. Wubbena, 26 Ill. 2d 62, 185 N.E.2d 850 (1962).
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The theory that the bank or trust company "is a mere stakeholder ' ' 138 has been rejected. Pursuant to the agreement, the
bank or trust company has an obligation to the survivor to pay
him. 39 The payment to the survivor, and the acceptance of a
receipt therefor, discharges the bank or trust company from liability, but does not determine the rights to the fund as between
the estate of the original owner and the surviving joint owner.
Thus, with the provisions of the statute,1 4 0 and the decisions in
Frey and Murgic, there is little cause for a bank or trust company to withhold payment of the proceeds of a savings or checking account to the surviving joint owner. Thus, if a financial institution resorts to an interpleader action, it is being extremely
cautious.
The presumption of donative intent which marks the initial
position of the respondent in such proceedings is a great procedural advantage. Unless called as an adverse party, the respondent may avail himself of a motion for a finding in his favor
at the close of petitioner's proof without giving testimony if the
petitioner has not rebutted the presumption of donative intent.
The presumption is advantageous in both its procedural and its
substantive aspects. It has greater meaning than that a party
has made a prima facie case. The survivor has a presumption of
law rather than one of fact. The presumption is not evidence,
but it is a principle of law which creates the need for evidence
to rebut it, and the failure to rebut it will cause the presumption
to prevail.14 1 While in itself it is neither evidence nor argument,
it accomplishes the same purpose. 4 2 Dicta in an Illinois decision
was to the effect that there is no difference in the meaning of the
term "presumption" and the term "inference" so far as the law
of evidence is concerned. 4 3 The Supreme Court of Illinois stated
that the terms "inference," "probability," "assumption" and
"presumption" have substantially the same meaning and import
when used in legal writings and opinions..4
1s8 Illinois Trust & Savings Bank v. Van Vlack, 310 Ill. 185, 141 N.E.
546 (1923) (Thompson J., dissenting). The majority opinion has since
been rejected. The majority held that the right of suvivorship must prevail
on a contract theory.
139 In re Estate of Wilson, 404 Ill. 207, 88 N.E.2d 662 (1949).
140 ILL. Ruv. STAT. ch. 76, §2(b) (1969) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §770

(1969), provides for joint accounts, upon written agreement, with the right
of survivorship.
141 Brown v. Brown, 329 Ill.
198, 160 N.E. 149 (1928).
142 Overcash v. Charlotte Electric, 144 N.C. 572, 57 S.E. 377 (1907).
143 Paulsen v. Cochfield, 278 11. App. 596 (1935).
144 Ohio Bldg. Safety Vault Co. v. Industrial Board, 227 Il1. 96, 115
N.E. 149 (1917); AEsoP's FABLES (Doubleday transl. 1968) :
The Man and the Lion: A man and a lion traveled together through

the forest. They soon began to boast of their respective superiority to
each other in strength and prowess. As they were disputing they passed

a statue carved in stone, which represented 'A lion strangled by a man'.
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The funds in a savings account on deposit in a bank or trust
company may be the subject of an inter vivos gift. On facts
created by not too unusual circumstances, it was held that the
law presumes the acceptance by the donee of a gift, and the
giving of the passbook of the account is an effective delivery. 145
Many matters involving an inter vivos gift have as witnesses
thereto only the alleged donor and the donee. However, the fact
that the donor is dead does not always prevent the establishment
of the gift. In civil matters, the law only requires the best proof
of which the case is susceptible or which can be reasonably
made. 146 Also, a respondent should not be handicapped by the
7
fact that a third person was present when the gift was made.' 4
Where a savings account is created in the name of a depositor, and he is labeled a "Trustee," with directions to the
banking institution that upon the death of the depositor the balance in the account is to be paid to a named beneficiary, an inter
vivos savings account trust is valid and enforceable by the named
beneficiary, or his representative if he has one.14 8 The trust
agreement so labeled does not meet with the requirements made
by the law for a valid testamentary bequest so the court adjudicates the issue as to whether a valid inter vivos trust is established. The court in ruling for the beneficiary in In re Estate of
Petralia,1 9 "accepted the position adopted by the American Law
Institute in §58 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts." 150 An
attempt to dispose of P.O.D. [Payable on Death] accounts by
testamentary bequest is ineffectual,"5 but the survivor of joint
tenancy accounts, joint testators, and beneficiaries of trust accounts may effectively dispose of the property by testamentary
15
bequest.
The traveler pointed to it and said: 'See there. How strong we are, and
how we prevail over even the king of beasts.' The lion replied: 'This

statue was made by one of you men.

If we lions knew how to erect

statues you would see the man placed under the paw of the lion.'
Of all of the definitions and rulings regarding the word "presumption" and

its synonyms, the one with the jeu de mots, and the wittiest, was rendered in
a Supreme Court of Missouri opinion that "'Presumptions' may be looked on
as the bats of the law, flitting in the twilight, but disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts." Mackovik v. Kansas City J.&C.B.R.R., 196 Mo., 550,
571, 94 S.W. 256, 262 (1906).
145 Schwanz v. Sangamo Electric Co., 294 Ill. App. 395, 13 N.E.2d 1007
(1938).
146 See note 136 supra.
147 In re Estate of Petralia, 32 Ill. 2d 134, 204 N.E.2d 1 (1965).

In re Estate of Foster, 104 Ill. App. 2d 447, 244 N.E.2d 620 (1969).
Ill. 2d 134, 204 N.E.2d 1 (1965).
15o Id. at 138, 204 N.E.2d at 3.
5'Estate of Schwendeman v. State Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 112 Ill. App.
148

14932

2d 273, 251 N.E.2d 99 (1969).
152 Klajbor v. Klajbor, 406 Ill. 513, 94 N.E.2d 502 (1950); Rucker v.
Harris, 91 Ill. App. 2d 208, 234 N.E.2d 392 (1968).
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2. CorporateStock, Bonds, etc.
When the property in controversy is corporate stock, bonds,
or other evidence of interest, the pertinent statutory provisions 15"
apply with the same effect as the law applies to bank accounts.
The statute authorizes the corporation, or other entity, upon the
order of the survivor, to make a transfer without inquiry and
without the incurrence of liability for doing so. It also provides
that all incriments, redemptions, etc. may be payable and delivered to any joint tenant thereof. The supreme court held with
regard to the corporate stock that:
A statutory right of survivorship exists and we think it unnecessary to follow the principles of common law joint tenancy whether
an agreement has been signed by the parties or not. The registration of stock ownership upon the books of the corporation in appropriate statutory language is sufficient to vest legal title .... 15,
This statement was made notwithstanding the court's earlier holdings to the contrary. A transfer and valid gift was sanctioned where the unendorsed certificates had been transferred to
the donee and the transfer was not made on the books of the
corporation.155
When the property in controversy is a promissory note, the
statute applies 1 6 and makes such property an exception to the
statute which abolished joint tenancy with the right of survivorship in personal property."
It should be pointed out that the
promissory note must designate the payees in language approriate to create rights of survivorship.'1 8
3. Contents of Safety Deposit Boxes
Property found in a safety deposit box rented jointly causes
a recurring problem. The presence of individual property in a
safety deposit box rented jointly in the names of the decedent
and others does not make the contents of the box joint tenancy
property.1 9 The question of ownership of the property frequently arises because the survivor of lessees of the box, usually
a relative, hastens to the vault upon the death of his joint owner
and removes the contents before the box can be inventoried.
4. PartnershipInterests
In Frey the court was faced with an unusual property sub153

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 76, §2(b) (1969).

Frey v. Wubbena 26 Ill. 2d 62, 185 N.E.2d 850 (1962).
In re Estate of Toigo, 107 Ill. App. 2d 395, 246 N.E.2d 68 (1969);
In re Estate of Hill, 42 Ill. App. 2d 396, 192 N.E.2d 429 (1963). In the Hill
154

155

matter, the stock was not endorsed and remained in the name of the alleged

donor. The court held that the delivery of the stock, together with the expressions of gift to the donee, was sufficient to constitute a gift.
156 ILL.

REV.

STAT.

ch. 76, §2(b) (1969).

The statute includes within

its provision as a classification of property rights "other evidences of in-

debtedness or of interest".
157 Frey v. Wubbena, 26 Ill. 2d 62, 185 N.E.2d 850 (1962).
158 Id. at 75, 185 N.E.2d at 858.
159 Id.
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ject. The decedent had executed a certificate in which he declared his one-fourth interest in a partnership to be joint between himself and his two daughters. The court held that his
attempt was wholly ineffective under the Uniform Partnership
Act. 110 It said that "[t]he very nature of a partnership is such
that joint tenancy between one of the partners and a stranger to
the partnership would be abhorrent to the act."' 1
5. Certificates of Deposit
Certificates of deposit, which are now in popular use, should
be governed by the same principles promulgated for savings and
checking accounts since there is a deposit made and the issuance
of a certificate is made in lieu of the custom of issuing a passbook. It has been held that if a certificate of deposit is in "apt
2
language," the statute would apply.'1

6. United States Savings Bonds
The statute is clear and concise as to the ownership of a:
United States Savings Bond, debenture, note or other obligation of

the United States of America ... issued ... payable to a designated
person and upon his death to another person therein named....

[It shall] become the property of and be payable to the survivor

of them. 163

Without the statute the effect would be the same since federal
regulations which provide for payment to a survivor would prevail. 6 4

7. Credit Union Interests
In a reported decision involving the proceeds of credit union
funds held jointly by the decedent and another, while the reviewing court's opinion makes no mention of the statute and the presumption which arises thereunder, it applied the ruling and the
reasoning in the Murgic matter that the written agreement spoke
"the whole truth.165

8. Real Estate
With the constitutional demise of the various probate courts
in the State of Illinois, and the constitutional unification of courts
into Circuit Courts, the limitation of jurisdiction regarding cita160 Id.; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 106%, §7 (1969) provides in pertinent part:
In determining whether a partnership exists, these rules shall apply:
(1) Except as provided by Section 16, (re liability), persons who are not
partners as to each other are not partners as to third persons. (2) Joint
tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entireties, joint property,
common property, or part ownership does not of itself establish a part-

nership, whether such co-owners do or do not share any profits made by

the use of the property.
161 Frey v. Wubbena, 26 Ill. 2d 62, 75, 125 N.E.2d 850, 858 (1962).
162 Id. at 74, 185 N.E.2d at 857.
163 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 76, §2 (1969).
164 Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
165 In re Estate of Dawsen, 103 Ill. App.

(1968).

2d 362, 367, 243 N.E.2d 1, 3
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tion proceedings to adjudicate title to real estate was removed.
Formerly, the Probate Court was limited to the adjudication of
title and right to possession of personal property, and could conduct inquiry and compel the production and recovery of documents which were evidence of the title to realty.16
Now that
the Circuit Court has unlimited original jurisdiction, "the complete determination of Article XV proceedings now lie within
the competence of the Probate Division . . . Plenary actions in
the Equity Division . . . for an accounting or for the adjudication of title to real estate are not now required.' ' 1 7 For the court
to adjudicate the title to real estate it must have jurisdiction over
every person or other entity which claims title thereto and interests therein. An order upon a respondent to deliver to the
petitioner property not in his possession or under his control is a
nullity.168

INTER Vivos GIFTS
Regarding the inter vivos gifts of personal property it was
held that "[i]n addition to donative intent, other elements must
be present. The donor must part with exclusive dominion and
control over the subject of the gift and there must be delivery. ' 160
The delivery may be actual or constructive,' 1 0 and acceptance of
the property may be presumed as a matter of law. 171 The possession of the property standing alone is no indication of ownership.
This is particularly true where the evidence of property has the
name of two or more parties thereon since each cannot have manual possession at the same time. 17 2 Where the respondent in a
citation proceeding has not obtained possession of the property
until after the death of the decedent, he has the burden of proving ownership.Y3 Gifts asserted after death of the alleged donor
are regarded with suspicion.174
WHEN ON THE DEFENSIVE

The citation process served, or allegedly served, upon the
respondent may upon proper showing be quashed as any other
process. Obviously, a ground for quashing the process would be
166 Kahn, Discovery and Recovery Citations in the Probate Court, 44
ILL. B.J. 202 (1955), citing Sims v. Powell, 390 Ill. 610, 62 N.E.2d 456 (1945).
167 In re Estate of Garrett, 81 Ill. App. 2d 141, 150, 224 N.E.2d 654,
659 (1967).
168 Id. at 148, 224 N.E.2d at 658.
169 Frey v. Wubbena 26 Ill. 2d 62, 72, 185 N.E.2d 850, 856 (1962).
170 In re Estate of Watson, 120 Ill. App. 2d 83, 89, 256 N.E.2d 113, 116

(1970).

171 Chicago Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Cohn, 197 Ill. App. 326, 329
(1916).
172 Illinois Trust and Savings Bank v. Van Vlack, 310 Ill. 185, 192, 141
N.E. 546, 548 (1923).
17' In re Estate of Bickford v. Bickford, 74 Ill. App. 2d 190, 219 N.E.2d
159 (1966); In re Estate of Vercillo v. Gagbardi, 27 Ill. App. 2d 151, 169
N.E.2d 364 (1966).
174 Estate of Williams v. Tuch, 313 Ill. App. 230, 39 N.E.2d 695 (1942).
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improper service. In view of the mandatory language of the
statute regarding service of the process not less than ten days
prior to the return day, it would appear to be error to allow the
respondent more time rather than compelling the petitioner to
affect another service upon the respondent. The statute also
provides for service and return of the citation in the same manner as provided for summons in civil cases.17 5 That provision
could lead to a variety of reasons for quashing the service of the
citation.
Once effective service has been made, the respondent may
then attack the pleadings in the same manner as available to
parties in civil matters. While there may be successive citation
for discovery, providing such repeated use against the same respondent is not unreasonable, a ruling or determination on the
issues raised in a petition for recovery of property in favor of
the respondent is res judicata. The party in whose favor the
judgment is entered, if served with a citation issued as a result
of a new petition based on a different theory, should move to
strike the petition or file a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
estoppel by verdict. It has been held that where the petitioner
pursued the wrong remedy and the respondent's position had not
been prejudiced, the petitioner should be allowed to proceed on
another petition. The court said:
The quest for the assets of the estate of a deceased person is at
times very difficult and so important that it calls for the use of a
liberal construction of the powers of the court in the 7aid
of an at6
tempt to secure information or recovery of the assets.1
The ruling does not say, nor does it imply, that the court would
permit a second petition for recovery of the same property from
the same respondent after a prior adjudication of the former petition on the merits.
Available to the parties, if pleadings have been filed by both
sides of the controversy, is the applicable statute for a determination of ownership of property on a motion for summary judgment.
The most utilized defense to a petition for recovery is that
the decedent gave the property to the respondent. With the advent of Mxrgic, the respondent begins with the statutory presumption, when applicable, that such was the intent of the decedent. As to gifts inter vivos, the respondent assumes the burden of proving a gift and all of the necessary elements which
constitute valid and enforceable ownership on the part of the
donee.
175

176

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, §183 (1969).
Estate of Oppenheim, 63 Ill. App. 2d 284, 211 N.E.2d 403 (1965).
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There are a variety of alleged statements and comments attributed to decedents by respondents in defense of petitions for
recovery. The more common are: "I want.., to have this when
I am gone;" ".. .has been good to me and I want to leave this
for her;" "When I die I want to be sure ...is taken care of;" "It
is your money." We are admonished to keep in mind the ease
with which such oral declarations are made and how they may be
unwittingly changed in repetition over a period of time. It is77
common knowledge that people use such expressions every day.
If such comments or declarations are promises to pay in the future, the person making such a comment or declaration does not
create a trust with himself as the settlor and/or trustee. 17 8
In attempting to recover the property in dispute, numerous
reasons are alleged by petitioners as justification for the decedent's having created joint ownership of property merely for the
convenience of the decedent while he was alive. Some of those
same reasons have been employed by respondents as the justification for the court finding a donative intent on the part of the
decedent and for finding ultimate gifts. Some of these reasons
are: kinship, health, age, mental condition, disparity in age, more
or less intelligence, business experience, fear, and trust. The
attorney who has to pursue recovery should consider the reason
for maintaining the claim of joint ownership as a convenience
to the decedent, and in defending, one should consider the reason
for maintaining that the creation of joint ownership was with
donative intent on the part of the decedent. This consideration
is important because such reasons have been given great weight
in the determination of ultimate ownership. 79
TRUSTS
The "conglomerate concept"'180 in at least three of its many
classifications, and the application of equitable principles relative
to that great body of law, has been considered in citation proceedings. Space and time limitations do not permit an exhaustive detailing of the application of the equitable and legal principles of "trusts" to the citation proceeding.'
Express Trusts
In order to create an express trust, it is sufficient that the
owner of the res be qualified mentally to form an intent and that
Lanterman v. Abernathy, 47 I1. 437 (1868).
178 Schaefer v. Schaefer, 141 11. 337, 31 N.E. 136 (1892).
425, 91 N.E.2d 419 (1950) and In re
179See Kester v. Crilly, 405 Ill.
App. 2d 3, 213 N.E.2d 83 (1965), as to how such
Estate of Bichl, 65 Ill.
factors are pertinent when a petitioner is asking the court to impose a
177

constructive trust.

18o Leighton, Elements of Equitable Relief, 2 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. &
PRoc. 230 (1969).
181 But see Leighton, Elements of Equitable Relief, note 180 supra.
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this intent to create a trust be manifested. Such intent may be
given orally or in writing or be evidenced by other acts.
An express trust in personal property may be created by
spoken words.1 12 In creating an express trust it is not necessary

that words such as "trust" or Trustee" be used. Conversely,
the use of such words, standing alone, do not necessarily indicate a trust intent. 183 It is essential, however, that the settlor
must have manifested by some external or outward expression
his definite intention that a trust be created. The settlor may
create the trust without any consideration to himself; he may
wholly divest himself of ownership without transferring the title by declaring himself as the holder of the property for another
person. A trust will arise when the settlor manifests an intention to create one.
There is a conflict among authorities as to the necessity
that the settlor convey or notify the beneficiary of the creation
of the trust in order for it to be effective. His failure to communicate his intention to the beneficiary, or any other person, is
evidence, although not conclusive, that he has not made a binding
decision and therefore lacks final intention to create a trust.
Oral declarations, taken to be promises to pay or deliver at a
future time, do not create an interest for the beneficiary and an
alleged trust must fail. "It is common knowledge that people use
every day such expressions as 'the money is yours' and 'I will
hold it for you' without any intention of creating a trust, but only
as an emphatic way of saying 'you will be paid.' 1184
The distinction between a declaration of trust and the
execution of a gift must be considered in a citation proceeding
as in other proceedings where the problem occurs. For an effective gift to be declared, a delivery, actual or constructive,
must be made to the donee so as to divest the donor of possession. However, no gift is made if the alleged donor who makes
a delivery is the holder of property in trust and lacks direction
from the beneficiary or other authoritative person to cause the
transfer of the res. "It has frequently been held that one who
takes from a trustee who is violating his trust while having notice of such violation becomes himself a trustee."185
It is very necessary to make a determination as to the legal
posture of the holder of the property. If one holds the property
of another merely as a debtor, the citation remedy is not availaId. at 264.
183 Schaefer v. Schaefer 141 Ill.
337, 31 N.E. 136 (1892).
182

184 Calou v. Jones, 50 dal. App. 2d 299, 122 P.2d 951 (1942); see also
Lanterman v. Abernathy, 47 Ill. 437 (1868).
185 Butts v. Estate of Butts, 119 Ill.
App. 2d 242, 255 N.E.2d 622 (1970),
Harris v. Ingleside Bldg. Corp., 370 Ill. 617, 19 N.E.2d 585 (1939); PEARY
ON TRuSTs,

7th ed., §334; Wabbe v. Schaub, 143 Ill.
App. 361 (1908).
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ble and the collection thereof must be pursued at law. The holder
may be a bailee. As a bailee he is not a fiduciary although both
are entrusted relations. Since a bailee has no title and cannot
sever the interest of the bailor in the property, he is unable to
make an effective sale of same. Thus, the petitioner in a citation proceeding may pursue his remedy against the holder of
the property as well as against the bailee. The position of a
wrongful possessor is not any better than the position of the
bailee who makes delivery to him. This is not true if the seller
of another's property was not a bailee and had such an interest
or possession which permitted the sale to be made to a bona fide
purchaser; then the action must be for a wrongful conversion of
property. Historically, the bailment action was at law; the trust
action was in equity. In a citation proceeding no distinction is
necessary.
An interesting problem is presented by the situation in
which a person wins a permanent trophy but is to give up possession of such trophy to the new winner after a year. This person holds the trophy in trust and such is the understanding at
the time he is presented the award.
The more common express trust which may be encountered in a citation proceeding is the trust savings account or the
Totten Trust. 188 In In re Estate of Petralia,the Illinois Supreme
Court held that a deposit by one person of his own money, in his
own name as trustee for another, standing alone, does not establish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It
is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor
dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act
or declaration, such as delivery of the pass book or notice to the
beneficiary.' 8 7
Constructive Trusts
When the proposed respondent has overreached his authority
regarding property held in a fiduciary capacity and the fiduciary
relationship has been breached, the law will apply the constructive trust theory. The proposed respondent must have been in a
fiduciary relationship as agent with his principal.
There is no invariable rule which determines the existence of a
confidential relationship, but ordinarily there must be not only
confidence of the one in the other, but also on the part of the
former some inequality, dependence, weakness, want of knowledge,
or other conditions giving to the latter some advantage over the
former.188
188Wilkinson v. Stitt, 175 Mass. 581, 56 N.E. 830 (1900).
See text
discussion following note 111 supra.
18732 Ill. 2d 134, 138, 204 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1965).
188 Jaeger v. Sechser, 65 S.D. 38, 43, 270 N.W. 531, 533
(1936).
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Such a fiduciary or confidential relationship "may exist as a
matter of law, as between principal and agent, guardian and
ward, attorney and client, and the like, or it may be moral, social, domestic, or even personal."' 18 9
The applicable law in the State of Illinois is fully set out in
an appellate court opinion. 90 Expressing the general rule of
Kester v. Crilly, 91 the appellate court opinion recited that:
In general, in the law of constructive trusts, a confidential
relationship exists in all cases when one person reposes trust and
confidence in another who thereby gains a resulting influence and
superiority over the first....

The mere existence of a confiden-

tial relationship prohibits the dominant party from seeking any
selfish benefit during the course of the relationship and affords a
basis for fastening a constructive trust upon property so acquired.
Where a confidential relationship exists, the presumption obtains
that the transaction complained of resulted from influence and
superiority and the burden rests upon the grantee to show that it
was fair, equitable and just and did not proceed from undue influence.... 192
The petitioner who claims the breach and abuse of a fiduciary relationship assumes the burden of proving it as a condition precedent to the court's imposing a constructive trust.1 93
Once the petitioner shows the existence of a fiduciary relationship, there is the presumption that the respondent-agent acted
indiscreetly and the burden shifts to such respondent-agent to

prove that his acts were done in good faith.9

4

The law of the

State of Illinois is that transactions of parties who are in a confidential or fiduciary relationship, which is of a benefit to the
dominant party, is "prima facie voidable" on the grounds of public policyL9 and are presumed fraudulent as a result of undue influence by the dominant party.'
Thus, upon examination and analysis of the facts and circumstances whereby the proposed or anticipated respondent became the owner or possessor of property which formerly belonged
to a decedent, the attorney may find that he can recover the
'99 Fisher v. Burgiel, 382 11. 42, 46 N.E.2d 380 (1943); Hensan v.
Cooksey, 237 Ill. 620, 86 N.E. 1107 (1909) ; Irwin v. Sample,, 213 Ill. 160, 72
N.E. 687 (1904).
L9oIn re Estate of Bichl, 65 Ill. App. 2d 3, 213 N.E.2d 83 (1965).
191 Kester v. Crilly, 405 Ill. 425, 91 N.E.2d 419 (1950).
192 Id. at 432, 91 N.E.2d at 423.
9 Maley v. Burns, 6 Ill. 2d 11, 17, 126 N.E.2d 695, 698 (1955). See
Koziol v. Harris, 82 Ill. App. 2d 472, 226 N.E.2d 387 (1967), where a party

customarily made his accounts in joint tenancy with the person he was residing with at the time. The controversy had as its subject the plaintiff's
entire estate. "It is unreasonable to presume a gift or an advancement where
the subject consists of the entire estate of the alleged donor".
119Seeley v. Rowe, 370 Ill. 336, 18 N.E.2d 874 (1938); Tarpoff v. Karandjeff, 51 Ill. App. 2d 454, 201 N.E.2d 549 (1964).
195 Eichhorst v. Eichhorst, 338 Ill. 185, 170 N.E. 269 (1930); In re

Estate of Lightner, 81 Ill. App. 2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 417 (1967).
"IsMcCord v. Roberts, 334 Ill. 233, 165 N.E. 624 (1929).
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property on a constructive trust theory.

So too may the theory

be employed by another person for the recovery of property from

an estate if the decedent or ward became the ostensible owner or
possessor of property as the result of an encroachment on the
confidential relationship he had with such other person.

When applying the principle that a constructive trust results from the acts of the parties, one must look to the facts as
they existed when the res was acquired by the trustee.'9 7

These

acts must consist of fraud or other wrongful conduct in order for
a constructive trust to be imposed. "Once actual fraud, wrongful, unfair, or unconscionable conduct is shown, or when a fidu-

ciary relation is established, the bases for a constructive trust
are established."'198
As in other citation proceedings, the common defense
pleaded to defeat the imposition of a constructive trust is that
the decedent made a gift of the property to the respondent.
Other common defenses which will defeat the imposition of a

constructive trust are: breach of written contract, no proof of
fraud or overreaching of fiduciary duty, and lack of a confiden-

tial relationship between the parties.

9

Resulting Trusts
Since, by definition, a resulting trust cannot be created expressly, but is a creature of the law, it often arises as a result of
the manner in which the res is used. This includes the situation
in which the possessor of the disputed property treats it as his
own.

20 0

197 Streeter v. Gamble, 298 Ill. 332, 131 N.E. 589 (1921).

See Leighton,

Elements of Equitable Relief, 2 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 230 (1969)

for excellent reading material on the subject:
The other inquiry, absent actual fraud, unfair or wrongful conduct, is
whether at the time there was a relationship of trust and confidence.
Here, the possibilities are numerous. An agent is in a fiduciary relation with his principle. [Bremer v. Bremer, 41 Ill. 154, 104 N.E.2d
299 (1952).] A joint venturer owes a duty of trust and confidence to
his fellow joint venturer. [Spencer v. Wilsey, 330 Ill.
App. 439, 71
N.E.2d 804 (1947).] An employee, in most instances, is in a fiduciary
relation with his employer. [Tinkoff v. Wyland, 272 Ill. App. 280
(1933).]
A husband owes a duty of trust to his wife with regard to
family property. [Maurica v. Haugen, 387 Ill. 186, 56 N.E.2d 367
(1944).] A son or daughter may be in a fiduciary relation with a parent
who is unable to care for his or her affairs. [Oster v. Oster, 414 I1. 470,
111, N.E.2d 319 (1953.] Other relations can be found out of which flow
trust and confidence, and are thus fiduciary in nature. In any of these
breach of the fiduciary relation will give rise to the trust, ex maleficio
to be imposed on the thing gained.
Id. at 268. See Frey v. Wubbena, 26 Ill. 2d 62, 185 N.E.2d 850 (1962)
for the right of a husband to dispose of his property.
198 "A constructive trust must be established by clear and convincing
evidence among which must be evidence of a traceable and identificable
property or fund against which the trust must attach." Estate of Franke,
124 Ill.
App. 2d 24, 33, 259 N.E.2d 841, 845 (1970).
199 Leighton, Elements of Equitable Relief, 2 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. &
PRoc. 230, 269 (1969).
200

Id. at 265,
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In examining the facts which give rise to the resulting trust,
the court will look to the facts which existed at the time the title
passed to the alleged trustee.2 0 1 The surrounding circumstances,
and the conduct of the parties, are of great importance in making the determination as to the imposition of a trust. "A resulting trust is based upon the presumed intention of the parties
distilled from their conduct, and comes into being at the instant

the title vests or not at all ....

"202

Some of the factors considered by the courts in determining
whether the transfer of disputed property was made with donative intent or merely for the convenience of the decedent are relevant to the issue of whether a resulting trust should be imposed.
The kinship of the parties to the alleged trust is of the utmost
importance. "In determining whether the requirements for a
resulting trust are present, it is proper to take into account the
family relationship of the parties and the informal character of
'2 0 3
their arrangement.
The existence of, or lack of a family relationship is important. Where a kinship does exist, the degree of kindred or
relationship should be considered. There is a presumption of a
gift where a husband was the owner, purchaser, or grantor of
property and his wife is the recipient or grantee. 20 4 The court
will permit the presumption even if the marital union was void,
and one of the parties, particularly the grantor, was under the
impression that the grantee was his lawful spouse. While the
author has not found an Illinois case which dealt with an anticipated marital relationship between grantor and grantee, it was
held in another jurisdiction that the presumption of a gift rather
than the imposition of a resulting trust was applied where the
grantee was the grantor's fiancee. 20 5 The court found a gift
where a father was the grantor and the grantee was a mentally
incompetent son. 20 1 The question remains as to whether an Illinois court would make the same ruling if the grantee were an
illegitimate child. The court has found a gift where the grantor
was the mother and her child the grantee. 20 7 When the marital
201 Note that in the constructive trust situation, the facts which the
court looks to are those at the time the alleged trustee acquired the property.
Resulting trusts are also referred to as "presumptive" trusts or as
"intended" trusts.
202 Suwalski v. Suwalski, 88 Ill. App. 2d 419, 422, 232 N.E.2d 64, 66
(1967).
203 In
re Estate of Roth, 96 Ill. App. 2d 292, 300, 238 N.E.2d 607, 612
(1968); In re Estate of Habel, 88 Ill. App. 2d 194, 203, 231 N.E.2d 616, 620
(1967); see also Merschat v. Merschat, 1 Ill. App. 2d 429, 117 N.E.2d 868
(1954).
204 Reed v. Reed, 135 Ill. 482, 25 N.E. 1095 (1890).
205 Kimbro v. Kimbro, 199 Cal. 344, 249 P. 180 (1926).
206 Cartwright v. Wise, 14 Ill. 417 (1853).
207 Euans v. Curtis, 190 Ill. 197, 60 N.E. 56 (1901).
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relationship is reversed and the wife is the owner, purchaser, or
grantor of the property, and her husband is the recipient or
20 8
grantee, the courts have presumed a trust rather than a gift.
Whether the effect of the many changes in the status women will
lead a court to find a gift rather than impose a trust remains to
be seen.
The degree of kindred, whether distant rather than close,
calls for a different application of the law. It was determined
that there was a trust rather than a gift as between an uncle
and his niece. 2 0° It is entirely reasonable to expect a different
ruling if such a relationship exists, but the grantor stands in
0
loco parentis to the not-so-close kindred.21
Obviously, the gift theory fails upon proof that the grantor
and grantee had an oral agreement or some other evidence inconsistent with a gift theory.2 1' A person who voluntarily paid
the purchase price of property for another, and did not receive
a promise or an understanding to be reimbursed, cannot maintain the position necessary for the imposition of a resulting trust.
A person who provided funds as a loan for the purchase or other
212
acquisition of property may not have a resulting trust imposed.
However, if the person who claims a trust exists received funds
on loan from the alleged trustee so as to pay for the property
claimed to be held in trust, a trust will be imposed.2 1 3 It could
be presumed that the property was being held by the respondent
as security for the loan. The opinions are numerous that where
the funds for the purchase of real estate are provided by a person, and the title is conveyed to another, the law construes such
214
facts to constitute a resulting trust.
The attorney should consider if any other factors such as
health, mental condition, age, business experience, etc. exist. He
should also consider other motives such as the avoidance of the
settlor's creditors, avoidance of taxes, avoidance of marital
claims and responsibilities, and other reasons for creating a
trust. Should the property have been acquired by agreement for
aliquot payments in parts, then it is absolutely necessary that
the true facts be learned and the principles of law relative to
such situations be researched.
SUMMARY

The attorney confronted with the problem of ownership of
208 Wright v. Wright, 2 Ill. 2d 246, 118 N.E.2d 280 (1954); Crawford

v. Hurst, 307 Ill. 243, 138 N.E. 620 (1923).
209 Niland v. Kennedy, 316 Ill. 253, 147 N.E. 117 (1925).
21o Cook v. Blazis, 365 I1. 625, 7 N.E.2d 291 (1937).
211 Dorman v. Dorman, 187 Il. 154, 58 N.E. 235 (1900).
212 Cook v. Flatt, 338 Il. 428, 170 N.E. 428 (1930).
213

214

Towle v. Wadsworth, 147 Ill. 80, 30 N.E. 602, 35 N.E. 73 (1893).
1n re Estate of Jarodsky, 122 Ill. App. 2d 243, 258 N.E.2d 382 (1970).
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property which is involved in the administration of an estate
should first determine if he has sufficient facts to deal with the
issue of ownership. If he represents the petitioner and his
knowledge of the facts is insufficient, he may, and should, employ the citation procedure for discovery. From the knowledge
gained through discovery, he must determine if it is feasible to
proceed to a citation for recovery. Should a decision be reached
to attempt recovery of the property, a theory must be adopted
and the petition for the issuance of a citation for recovery
should have allegations necessary to support petitioner's position. The pleader must keep in mind that the type of property
to be recovered, the relationship of the parties, health, age and
many other factors are important to his theory. He must also
consider the legal presumptions and whether they are applicable
to the type of property involved.
The citation, the actual process to be served upon the respondent, must state in unambiguous language what it is that
the petitioner seeks from the person upon whom the process is
served.
It is not sufficient that the pleading include a prayer for recovery if the respondent is not informed to that effect by the
document which compels his appearance before the court. The
petition for the issuance of a citation, and the service thereof
are susceptible to attack by the use of all of the motions, including those which question the jurisdiction of the court, which are
permissible in any other civil proceeding and granted by the
Civil Practice Act.
The principal developments in citation proceedings resulted
from Supreme Court of Illinois opinions in four matters; Erwin
2 16
Frey v. Wubbena 217 and
v. Felter,215 Schneider v. Schneider,
Murgic v. Granite City Trust and Savings Bank.21s Under the
stimulus of each preceding opinion, the court abandoned the contract emphasis and adopted a gift emphasis. The thrust of the
law has been away from a conservative position (Erwin v. Felter) to a liberal one (Murgic.)
Counsel participating in a citation proceeding, as attorney
for the petitioner, as attorney for the respondent, or as a special
administrator must familiarize himself, if need be, with the legal
and equitable principles which relate to gifts and to trusts.
Many factors have given rise to a growing number of situations when a legal resolution of ownership of property is needed;
the increased number of estates in probate, the generally in215 283 Ill. 36, 119 N.E. 926 (1918).
216

6 Ill. 2d 180, 127 N.E.2d 445 (1955).
Il. 2d 62, 185 N.E.2d 850 (1962).
Ill. 2d 587, 202 N.E.2d 470 (1964).

217 26
218 31
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creased affluence of people, more business ventures and transactions, and the increased propensity of persons to avoid probate
due to recent publications. The more attempts made by laymen
to avoid probate by disposition of property prior to death, the
greater will be the number of situations requiring a judicial inquiry into the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction.

